Book Launching Speech (July 8, 2011)
Troubled Odyssey was my odyssey. When I outlined it in October 2009, I said I would finish it by June 2010. I finished it in June 2011. My original plan was to write mainly about the GRP-MILF peace negotiation. I would use a bit of Moro history and the MNLF phase of the rebellion as backgrounders. The comments I had written on the Government-MILF negotiation, I figured out, would make the writing of the book easy.
But as I wrote Part II, I realized that the Bangsamoro pursuit of their right to self-determination started after they had lost to the Americans the political independence they had defended against Spain.
The odyssey is that of the entire Bangsamoro nation, not just of the MILF.
The revision called for more materials and longer time to write. To lengthen more the time, I had to interrupt my work, at times for weeks, to comment on emerging issues.
Yet, it was a blessing. This clearer and more comprehensive picture of the Moro problem I came to realize.
The complaints and demands of the militant Moro leaders of the 1960s were essentially the same as those in the 1921 Sulu petition, 1924 Zamboanga declaration, 1934 Dansalan petition and 1935 Dansalan declaration of Moro militant leaders.
The Filipinization policy and program that Manila led by Manuel L. Quezon designed to assimilate the Moros after the abolition of the Moro Province in 1915 divided Moro leaders; it has essentially been carried out until today under different names and strategies to continue dividing Moro leaders.
The Americans abandoned their early plan to govern the Moros in a separate territory. They ignored the Moro petitions and obviously took the warning of troubles in the future as mere bluffs. They knew the enmity between the Moros and the Christian Filipinos. Had the Moro petitions been properly addressed, perhaps the outbreak of the Moro rebellion in 1973 could not have happened.
Mindanao and Sulu were considered colonies at the dawn of the Philippine Republic. This was evident during the Malolos Constitutional Convention when Christians – not Moros – represented Mindanao and Sulu. This mindset succeeding Manila leaders have maintained down to the present day; it has prevailed in the Malolos, 1935, 1972 and 1987 Constitutions, in policies for Mindanao and the Muslims and in land laws. This defined and set the tone of Moro disenchantment and dissent against the Government of the Philippines.
Moro leaders have only two options – eternal dependence on Manila or autonomy. If they choose the first, they need not unite but only outdo each other in seeking patronage from Manila. If they prefer autonomy, they must know what autonomy will solve the Bangsamoro problem – whether it is autonomy that Manila wants or autonomy that fulfills their right to self-determination. If the first, they only have to accept the autonomy Manila caters or would concede according to the present Constitution and laws. If the second, they have to unite.
In unity, they must have a clear vision of that autonomy; lay down clearly the principles; formulate the structure and the modalities of that autonomy and its government; then, negotiate to convince Manila and the Filipino majority that only that autonomy can solve the Bangsamoro problem. If the Moro leaders remain disunited as they are now, they will never attain that autonomy.