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SOUTH OF THE 8TH PARALLEL | From Manila to Santiago: A Trade Bridge Two Centuries in the Making

|  November 22, 2026 - 5:02 pm

SOUTH OF THE PARALLEL

The Philippines has signed its first South American trade agreement. But with bilateral trade at only US$143.5 million in 2025, the real challenge is turning diplomatic access into export orders

TAGUIG CITY (MindaNews / 22 November 2026) — In 1819, long before the Philippines became an independent republic, a Chilean shipping enterprise was already looking across the Pacific toward Manila.

The Compañía de Calcuta was established to develop commercial links between Chile, Manila, China, and India. At a time when sailing ships carried much of the world’s international commerce, Chilean merchants saw possibilities in a distant Asian port that had only recently emerged from more than two centuries of the Manila–Acapulco galleon trade.

They were looking for markets, merchandise, and opportunities.

More than two centuries later, Manila and Santiago are looking toward each other again.

On November 19, 2026, the Philippines and Chile formally signed their Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (PH–CL CEPA) at the Shenzhen International Exchange Center in Shenzhen, China.

The signing took place during a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the 33rd Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting.

Philippine Trade Secretary Ma. Cristina Aldeguer-Roque and Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister Francisco Pérez Mackenna signed the agreement, witnessed by President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. and Chilean President José Antonio Kast.

It was the Philippines’ first bilateral free trade agreement with a South American country and Chile’s 37th trade agreement. 

A historic occasion, certainly.

But history has a way of reminding us that opening a trade route is not the same as filling it with commerce.

For all the history connecting the two countries, their bilateral merchandise trade amounted to only US$143.5 million in 2025.

Chile, meanwhile, imported more than US$82 billion worth of goods from the world that year.

The Philippines supplied barely a fraction of one percent.

There, in that enormous difference between what Chile buys and what the Philippines sells, lies both the promise and the challenge of this new agreement.

Two Centuries of Looking Across the Pacific

The relationship between Chile and the Philippines is older than their formal diplomatic ties.

During the nineteenth century, Chilean merchants sought connections with Asian markets through Manila. By the 1840s, Chile had established a consular presence in the city, reflecting its interest in expanding commerce across the Pacific.

The Philippines and Chile established formal diplomatic relations in 1947, shortly after Philippine independence.

Over the succeeding decades, the relationship developed through diplomatic exchanges and agreements involving agriculture, investment, mining, education, and other fields.

But commerce never quite caught up with diplomacy.

The geographical distance was considerable. Shipping connections were less developed than those linking the Philippines to its traditional markets in East Asia, Southeast Asia, North America, and Europe.

And businesses naturally followed established trading routes.

For Philippine exporters, Japan, China, the United States, South Korea, and ASEAN countries offered familiar markets, established logistics, and commercial networks built over generations.

South America remained largely beyond the horizon.

The new agreement attempts to change that.

Negotiations proceeded through 2025 and 2026, with their conclusion announced in Manila in July 2026 during a visit by Chilean Foreign Minister Pérez Mackenna. The formal signing followed four months later in Shenzhen. 

The CEPA establishes a framework covering trade in goods, services, investment, digital commerce, intellectual property, and economic cooperation.

But the agreement must now overcome something that diplomatic signatures alone cannot eliminate: the inertia of established trading relationships.

The US$82-Billion Market We Barely Serve

Chile is not a small economy waiting to discover international trade.

It is one of Latin America’s more outward-looking economies, with an extensive network of free trade agreements and commercial relationships spanning Asia, Europe, and the Americas.

In 2025, Chile imported approximately US$82.22 billion in merchandise.

China accounted for about 27 percent of those imports. The United States supplied another 18 percent. The European Union, Brazil, and Argentina were also major sources.

Chile buys petroleum, machinery, automobiles, electronics, pharmaceuticals, industrial materials, and a wide variety of consumer products.

It is a market of nearly 20 million consumers, but its significance extends beyond population size. Chilean industries require imported equipment and components, while households purchase goods from suppliers across the world.

Against that background, Philippine exports remain modest.

Chile’s official statistics show that its imports from the Philippines increased from US$42.4 million in 2020 to US$71.1 million in 2025.

That represents growth of approximately 68 percent over five years.

Encouraging, certainly.

But still small.

Consider Vietnam.

In 2025, Vietnam supplied approximately US$1.68 billion in merchandise to Chile—roughly 24 times the Philippine figure.

Both Vietnam and the Philippines are Southeast Asian economies separated from Chile by the same vast Pacific Ocean.

Yet one has established a substantially larger commercial presence.

The difference cannot be explained by distance alone.

It invites closer examination of manufacturing competitiveness, export promotion, product specialization, logistics, investment, and the ability of enterprises to cultivate overseas buyers.

A trade agreement can help address some of these constraints.

It cannot resolve all of them.

What We Already Sell

There is another interesting feature of Philippine–Chile trade.

Contrary to what one might expect, the Philippines does not sell Chile primarily agricultural products.

Among our leading exports in 2025 were multifunction printers, projectors, electrical equipment, synthetic fishing nets, chemicals, and printing-related products.

Multifunction inkjet printers alone accounted for approximately US$17.7 million.

Desiccated coconut, at about US$3.1 million, was among the notable agricultural exports.

This composition tells us something important.

The Philippines already participates in Chile’s market through manufactured goods and industrial supply chains.

The CEPA could help expand that presence by reducing tariffs, improving regulatory predictability, and facilitating investment and commercial cooperation.

The Department of Trade and Industry says virtually all existing Philippine exports to Chile will benefit from duty-free treatment under the agreement, including electronics, machinery, desiccated coconut, carrageenan, and processed tuna. 

Those benefits will become operational according to the agreement’s entry-into-force provisions and applicable tariff schedules.

But lower tariffs are only one part of competitiveness.

A Philippine product must still reach Chile at a price that can compete with products from China, Vietnam, Brazil, the United States, and other established suppliers.

It must meet technical standards.

It must arrive reliably.

And someone in Chile must want to buy it.

These are matters that cannot be settled at a negotiating table.

They must be addressed by enterprises, exporters, logistics providers, trade officials, and investors working together long after the signing ceremony has ended.

The Other Side of the Trade Ledger

The agreement also creates opportunities for the Philippines to diversify its imports.

Chile is a major producer of copper, a metal increasingly important to electrical infrastructure, renewable energy systems, manufacturing, and digital technologies.

Copper is essential to power transmission, electric motors, transformers, and many of the technologies associated with the energy transition.

For a Philippines seeking to expand its renewable energy capacity, modernize its electrical networks, and strengthen its manufacturing sector, access to reliable industrial inputs has strategic value.

Yet the bilateral trade figures also reveal considerable volatility.

Chile exported approximately US$148.7 million worth of copper to the Philippines in 2024, according to Chilean statistics. Those shipments were absent from the corresponding 2025 bilateral records.

Consequently, total merchandise trade between the two countries declined sharply, from approximately US$271.7 million in 2024 to US$143.5 million in 2025.

This illustrates how a narrow trading relationship can be influenced by changes in just a few major products.

A more diversified commercial relationship would be less dependent on individual commodities or shipments.

The CEPA offers a framework for such diversification.

Whether businesses take advantage of it is another question.

Can Mindanao Find a Place in Santiago?

From where we sit south of the eighth parallel, the agreement deserves attention for reasons beyond diplomatic history.

Mindanao produces commodities and processed goods that could find markets in Chile and, eventually, other parts of South America.

Consider coconut.

Across Northern Mindanao, Davao Region, Caraga, and other producing areas, coconut farming supports households, traders, processors, and exporters.

Much of the discussion about coconut development has focused on improving productivity, rehabilitating aging trees, and moving farmers toward higher-value products.

Chile already imports Philippine desiccated coconut.

That established trade provides a starting point for examining opportunities in coconut milk, coconut oil, specialty ingredients, and other processed products.

But a tariff preference will not automatically make a coconut processor in Mindanao competitive.

Processors must meet food-safety standards, maintain consistent quality, secure sufficient volumes, and manage freight costs across the Pacific.

The opportunity becomes meaningful only when those conditions are satisfied.

Then there is tuna.

General Santos has built a substantial seafood-processing industry supported by fishing, canning, cold storage, and export logistics.

Processed tuna is among the products identified by the Department of Trade and Industry as potentially benefiting from improved market access.

But Chile is also a significant seafood-producing and seafood-consuming economy.

Philippine exporters would have to identify particular market segments where their products offer advantages in price, quality, convenience, or specialization.

Seaweed and carrageenan present another possibility.

Mindanao and the island provinces of the southern Philippines have long supplied seaweed to processors and international markets.

Carrageenan, used in food processing and other industries, represents an opportunity to move farther along the value chain.

Instead of exporting only raw or minimally processed materials, enterprises can seek greater value through processing, quality assurance, product development, and industrial applications.

The same questions arise for bananas, pineapples, and other tropical fruit products.

Mindanao has considerable production capacity and established export experience.

But Chile is far away.

Fresh fruit must survive long shipping distances, satisfy phytosanitary requirements, and compete with suppliers that may enjoy shorter transport routes.

Processed fruit, dried products, and specialty ingredients may offer different opportunities.

The point is not that every Mindanao commodity will suddenly find a profitable market in Chile.

It is that the agreement gives exporters another market worth examining seriously.

And serious examination requires more than enthusiasm.

It requires market intelligence.

The Missing Middle Between Agreements and Exports

Over the years, I have seen how governments celebrate investment commitments, trade agreements, and market-opening initiatives.

These are legitimate achievements.

They create possibilities that did not previously exist.

But there is often a missing middle between the announcement and the economic result.

A trade agreement is signed.

Tariffs are reduced.

A market becomes more accessible.

Then what?

Who identifies the Chilean importers interested in Philippine coconut products?

Who helps a tuna processor in General Santos understand Chilean labeling and sanitary requirements?

Who connects a carrageenan producer with food manufacturers in Santiago?

Who determines whether shipments can be consolidated to reduce freight costs?

Who helps a small exporter finance production while waiting for an overseas buyer to pay?

And who follows up six months or a year later to determine whether any actual business resulted?

These questions are not peripheral to trade policy.

They are the work of making trade policy succeed.

For large multinational manufacturers, established commercial networks may already provide the answers.

For smaller Philippine enterprises, particularly those outside Metro Manila, the barriers are more formidable.

They need access to reliable market information, technical assistance, financing, certification, logistics, and credible buyers.

This is where government export-promotion agencies, business chambers, industry associations, banks, and local economic development institutions should work together.

A trade agreement signed in Shenzhen must eventually become a purchase order received in Cagayan de Oro, Davao, General Santos, or another producing community.

Otherwise, the benefits remain concentrated among enterprises already capable of navigating international markets.

The Competition Is Already There

One should also resist the temptation to describe Chile as a gateway to an entirely new and waiting market.

Chile is already deeply integrated into global trade.

Its suppliers include some of the world’s most competitive exporting economies.

Many enjoy preferential access through existing agreements.

Philippine businesses entering Chile will not be arriving in an empty marketplace.

They will be competing for shelf space, industrial contracts, distribution arrangements, and customer loyalty against suppliers who have spent years building commercial relationships.

Nor does a trade agreement with Chile automatically provide preferential access to the rest of South America.

Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and other economies have their own trade rules and market requirements.

Chile can serve as a commercial bridge through business networks, logistics relationships, and market experience.

But that bridge must be built enterprise by enterprise.

For the Philippines, the more useful question is not simply how many new markets we can enter.

It is how many products we can sell competitively, consistently, and profitably once we enter them.

Counting What Matters

The Department of Trade and Industry has described the CEPA as part of the country’s broader effort to diversify markets, strengthen manufacturing, attract investment, and create better jobs.

Those are reasonable objectives.

But they should also become measurable commitments.

A year or two after the agreement takes effect, we should be asking whether Philippine exports to Chile have increased beyond their historical levels.

We should know how many additional Philippine enterprises have begun exporting there.

We should know which products have gained market share.

We should know whether the agreement has generated new investments, supply-chain partnerships, and employment opportunities.

And we should be able to identify which regions of the Philippines have benefited.

For Mindanao, the most meaningful indicators may not be found in the national trade statistics alone.

They may be found in a coconut processor expanding production, a seafood exporter securing a new buyer, or a small manufacturer hiring additional workers because an overseas order has become regular business.

Trade becomes development when its benefits move beyond the port and into the places where people work and earn their living.

That is a higher standard than counting agreements signed.

But it is the standard that matters.

The Bridge Must Carry Something

In 1819, Chilean merchants looked toward Manila and imagined a commercial connection across the Pacific.

They had no container ships, electronic customs systems, digital marketplaces, or modern trade agreements.

They had sailing vessels, commercial ambition, and the belief that distant markets could be connected.

More than two centuries later, the Philippines and Chile possess tools those merchants could scarcely have imagined.

We have modern ports, international shipping networks, digital communications, and sophisticated manufacturing and agricultural industries.

And on November 19, 2026, in Shenzhen, China, representatives of the two countries signed an agreement intended to make commerce between them easier.

The ceremony brought together two presidents, two governments, and a commercial relationship whose beginnings reach back to the age of sailing ships.

What remains is the practical work of using it.

Somewhere in Mindanao, a coconut processor may be looking for a new market.

A tuna exporter may be searching for another buyer.

A seaweed enterprise may be trying to move from raw materials into higher-value products.

A fruit grower may be wondering whether there are customers beyond the markets that have traditionally purchased his harvest.

For them, Santiago is not merely a distant capital on the other side of the Pacific.

It could become another destination for what they produce.

But that possibility will not be realized by signatures, speeches, or ceremonies alone.

It will require competitive enterprises, reliable supply chains, market intelligence, export financing, and sustained promotion.

A free trade agreement opens the door.

Someone must still find the customer, make the product, arrange the shipment, and deliver what was promised.

Two centuries ago, Chilean merchants imagined a trade bridge to Manila.

Today, that bridge has acquired a modern legal framework.

The question is no longer whether we can build a bridge across the Pacific.

It is whether we can fill it with the goods, services, investments, and opportunities that make the journey worthwhile.

And for those of us south of the eighth parallel, the most important measure will be whether some of those opportunities finally reach our own shores.

(MindaViews is the opinion section of MindaNews. South of the 8th Parallel is a reflective civic column written from the vantage point of a Mindanao-born senior who has lived the arc from Ozamiz to Cotabato, Davao, Manila, Cagayan de Oro, and now Taguig. The 8th Parallel North is the line of latitude eight degrees above the Equator that runs across Mindanao, placing the island firmly in the tropical belt and slightly removed from the country’s center. Rooted in memory yet attentive to policy, this Sunday column examines Mindanao’s concerns—governance, development, peace, inequality, migration, faith, and aging—with the steadiness of lived experience. This is not a view from the capital looking south, but a life shaped by the South looking outward, seeking perspective over noise and endurance over spectacle. Agbon also writes a Wednesday column, “What Now, Wednesday.” For more of his writings, please subscribe to https://marrizagbon.substack.com/)