PASIG CITY (MindaNews / 28 February) — A petition filed at the Supreme Court on February 9 challenging Bangsamoro Autonomy Act No. 86 will almost certainly delay BARMM’s elections again. That delay will test the patience of communities that have waited since 2022. It will fuel the narrative that the Bangsamoro cannot govern itself. And it will hand the peace process’s critics exactly the ammunition they need.
All of that is true. And the petition is still right.
The situation.
The Supreme Court struck down BAA No. 77 — the previous redistricting law — in September 2025. The order was clear: fix the unconstitutional district configurations in Lanao del Sur and Cotabato City. The BTA had until October 30, 2025.
The BTA missed that deadline by two and a half months. Then, when they finally passed BAA No. 86 in a 10-hour marathon session in the early morning of January 13, 2026, they replicated the same violations.
In Lanao del Sur, the Municipality of Kapai was grouped into District 2 — despite being neither contiguous nor adjacent to the other municipalities in that district. The three other municipalities in that grouping already have a combined population of 115,598, comfortably above the 100,000-person threshold required by the BOL. Kapai did not need to be there. Its inclusion was, as the petition plainly states, “a purely political maneuver devoid of demographic or legal necessity.”
In Maguindanao del Norte, the BTA carved up barangays from Cotabato City and Sultan Kudarat to manufacture a fifth district — despite the province being unable to support five districts while meeting the constitutional requirements of contiguity and population. The BTA appears to have treated the 32-seat figure as a mandatory quota. The BOL says “not more than 40%” of 80 seats. That is a ceiling of 32, not a floor.
In Cotabato City, residents of two barangays are now in legal limbo: they remain under the city’s administrative jurisdiction but BAA No. 86 classifies them as part of a provincial district for parliamentary elections. Two identities. Neither coherent. Neither chosen by the residents themselves.
The petitioners — Nasif Marangit, Samsodin Amella, and Datuan Magon Jr. — they asking the Court to strike only paragraphs 2, 3, and 7 of Section 4, invoking the law’s separability clause — specifically to prevent the respondents from using a full nullification as an excuse for another round of wholesale redistricting.
What this actually means.
The Supreme Court did not need to rule twice. After the BAA No. 77 decision, the BTA had a clear and specific mandate. They chose to defy it.
Elections built on unconstitutional districts would be forever contestable. Every MP elected from a gerrymandered constituency would carry that taint into parliament. The foundation matters. A house built on a cracked foundation does not become stable just because you add more floors.
Whether the BTA’s defiance reflects political calculation, institutional incapacity, or both, the consequence is the same: BARMM’s first parliamentary elections are delayed again, and the redistricting framework remains constitutionally disputed.
The stakes for the Bangsamoro
This is the fourth postponement of elections that were supposed to happen in May 2022. The BTA has governed without an electoral mandate for more than seven years, spending ₱114.7 billion in 2026 alone, without the democratic legitimacy that elections would provide.
Meanwhile, in July 2025, the MILF suspended the decommissioning of its remaining ~14,000 combatants, citing government failures on normalization. In March 2025, the Marcos administration replaced Al Haj Murad Ebrahim as Interim Chief Minister — what MILF First Vice Chairman Mohagher Iqbal called a “regime change.” Add to this another election delay. Add the growing perception that the BTA has become an institution oriented toward extending its own existence rather than completing its mandate.
That frustration has a destination. The BIFF and affiliated extremist groups have always operated in the space between broken promises and armed action. They do not need military victories. They need narratives. Every failed election date is another recruiter’s talking point.
And if elections are pushed to 2028 — which some BTA members are now openly advocating — the transition period would reach nine years. The BOL envisioned three.
At what point does a temporary governing body become the government?
What must happen
The Supreme Court must act quickly. A swift ruling — whatever it holds — is far less damaging than months of legal uncertainty. The Bangsamoro cannot afford another year of limbo.
If the Court strikes down the contested provisions, the BTA must do what it has twice failed to do: pass a compliant redistricting law — no manufactured districts, no gerrymandered groupings, no treating a ceiling as a floor.
The President must treat the BTA’s repeated legal failures as a governance problem that his administration owns. He appointed the current Interim Chief Minister and members of the BTA. “The BTA is autonomous” is not an answer when the BTA has defied the Supreme Court twice.
And international partners need to say clearly, as invested stakeholders — not as external pressure — that an extended transition to 2028 is not acceptable. Nine years of appointed government is not a transition. It is a permanent arrangement by another name.
Bangsamoro Patience
The Bangsamoro people have shown extraordinary patience. They accepted a transition that was supposed to last three years. They are now entering year eight.
The petition challenging BAA No. 86 will cause another delay. It is still the right action. The rules of a democratic election must be set fairly before the election begins.
But the delay is only worth its cost if those in power use the time to get it right — not to find new ways to postpone the reckoning.
But there is a limit to patience.
(MindaViews is the opinion section of MindaNews. Camilo “Bong” Montesa of Cagayan de Oro is a lawyer and professor based in Pasig City. He has spent three decades in conflict and peacebuilding work in the Philippines)
